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GLOSSARY 
 
Bias The disparity between the total seats two main parties would 
win in a notional election, or the disparity between the actual 
electoral outcomes and the alternative ones, if they garner 
equal or reverse vote shares in the notional election thereof. 
 
Competitive 
Authoritarianism 
A type of political system that fuses the forms and features of 
electoral democracy and the authoritarian structures and 
powers of a strong state with broadly inclusive and minimally 
pluralistic, open, and competitive elections, even though such 
elections are usually tarnished by civil-liberties violations, 
electoral manipulations, and/or an uneven playing field. 
 
Gerrymandering A form of intentional boundary discrimination that is carried 
out via a constituency delimitation that favours a party in 
either the presence or absence of malapportionment so that its 
votes are more efficiently distributed due to favourable 
constituency boundaries, thus allowing it to win more seats 
than other parties. 
 
Malapportionment A form of intentional numerical discrimination that is carried 
out via a constituency delimitation that produces disparity in 
constituency sizes or the number of electorate per district, or 
discrepancy between each district’s seat share and population 
share, therefore effectively inflates the vote values in smaller 
districts to the advantage of a party that is strong in such 
districts, and vice versa. 
 
Polarisation of 
Voter Preferences 
Comparatively small margin of total vote shares between the 
two main parties, coalitions, or alliances which shows that 
voter preferences are split almost equally between them, with 
neither of them a clear winner, and in a predominant party 
system, this is only possible in the presence of opposition 
cohesion which culminates in only two viable and real choices 
 x 
 
on the ballots in spite of the presence of third parties and 
independent candidates. 
 
Single-Member-
District-Plurality 
Electoral System 
(SMDP) 
A type of electoral system that operates at two levels: first, at 
the district level, electorate are allowed to cast a single vote 
for a candidate in a single-member territorial district, and the 
candidate with the most votes is then elected, regardless of 
whether it is by a majority or a plurality of votes; and second, 
at the national level, a party that has the highest number of 
members of parliament forms the government. 
 
Spurious Majority/ 
‘Wrong Winner’ 
Result/ ‘Perverse’ 
Result 
The winning party, coalition, or alliance wins a parliamentary 
election by its victory in a majority of seats even though it 
gains a lower national vote share than another party, coalition, 
or alliance. 
 
Third-party Votes The votes gained by smaller parties which are a subset of 
minor parties that does not ally with, isolated by, and wedges 
between two main parties, coalitions, or alliances, whereby 
such votes may be enough or not insofar as harming those 
main parties, coalitions, or alliances. 
 
Turnout An active, conscious, and low-cost political behaviour 
episodically partook by voters who come out and cast their 
ballots in an election, and in the absence of such a behaviour, 
some electorate inactively engage in abstention. 
 
Two-alliance 
System 
The nexus of interparty competitive relationships encapsu-
lated in their relative vote and seat shares that manifests at two 
levels: first, ‘local bipartism’ in which only two parties 
contest competitively at the district level; and second, 
‘national multipartism’ but which has been dominated by two 
main alliances, each of which contains allied parties that avoid 
contesting against each other in the same districts and have 
the explicit intention of forming a long-lasting governmental 
alliance. 
 xi 
 
MAJORITI PALSU: KEPUTUSAN ‘PEMENANG YANG SALAH’  
DALAM PILIHAN RAYA UMUM MALAYSIA YANG KETIGA BELAS 
 
ABSTRAK 
Pada Pilihan Raya Umum Malaysia yang Ketiga Belas 2013, perikatan peme-
rintah memenangi pilihan raya umum dengan memenangi kerusi majoriti mutlak di 
Dewan Rakyat, walaupun mereka hilang undi popular kepada perikatan pembangkang 
buat kali pertama. Keputusan ini dikenali sebagai ‘majoriti palsu’, keputusan ‘peme-
nang yang salah’, atau keputusan ‘tidak munasabah’ yang berlaku apabila sebuah parti, 
gabungan, atau perikatan memenangi pilihan raya umum walaupun hanya meraih undi 
keseluruhan yang kedua banyak. Kajian ini bermatlamat untuk, pertama sekali, menen-
tukan faktor-faktor dan cara-cara faktor tersebut mengakibatkan majoriti palsu di 
Malaysia; dan kedua, menentukan kesan-kesan relatif antara faktor-faktor sistemik dan 
faktor-faktor langsung, dan antara faktor-faktor institusional dan faktor-faktor reaktif, 
terhadap keputusan ini. Kajian ini menggunakan penyelidikan kaedah campuran selari 
yang merangkumi kaedah kuantitatif dan kaedah kualitatif dalam pengumpulan data 
dan analisis data. Kaedah kuantitatif adalah berasaskan data berangka yang diperolehi 
daripada keputusan pilihan raya manakala kaedah kualitatif adalah berasaskan data 
naratif yang diperolehi melalui temudaga dengan ahli-ahli parlimen. Penemuan kajian 
bersepadu mengesahkan bahawa, pertama sekali, perikatan pemerintah memenangi 
kerusi majoriti mutlak terutamanya disebabkan oleh kelebihan besar diberikan oleh 
malapportionment dan gerrymandering, dan secara terhadnya disebabkan oleh auto-
ritarianisme berdaya saing dan sistem single-member-district-plurality; kedua, sistem 
dua perikatan dan polarisasi pilihan pengundi merupakan punca-punca utama per-
atusan undi keseluruhan mereka adalah lebih rendah, manakala peratusan kehadiran 
 xii 
 
pengundi yang tinggi ialah punca sampingan; ketiga, pengaruh undi-undi yang diraih 
oleh parti ketiga dan calon bebas adalah amat kecil; akhirnya, keempat-empat kum-
pulan faktor memainkan peranan penting dalam menghasilkan majoriti palsu di Ma-
laysia, walaupun cara-cara ini berlaku adalah amat berbeza bagi faktor yang berlainan. 
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SPURIOUS MAJORITY: THE ‘WRONG WINNER’ RESULT  
IN THE THIRTEENTH GENERAL ELECTION OF MALAYSIA 
 
ABSTRACT 
In the Thirteenth General Election of Malaysia in 2013, the ruling alliance won 
the general election via their victory in a majority of seats, but unprecedentedly they 
lost the popular vote to the opposition alliance. Such a result is known as ‘spurious 
majority’, ‘wrong winner’ result, or ‘perverse’ result which occurs when the winning 
party, coalition, or alliance wins the election even though coming second in terms of 
their national vote share. This study aims to, first, determine the causal factors of, and 
examine the ways these causal factors engender, spurious majority in Malaysia; and 
second, find out the relative impacts between systemic factors and proximate factors, 
and between institutional factors and reactive factors, on such a result. To achieve 
these, this study uses the parallel mixed methods research that utilises both quantitative 
and qualitative methods in data collection and data analysis. The former method is 
based on numerical data derived from electoral outcomes, while the latter method is 
based on narrative data derived from interview accounts with members of parliament. 
The integrated findings of both methods show that, first, the ruling alliance’s victory 
in a majority of seats is primarily due to their strong lead given by malapportionment 
and gerrymandering and marginally due to competitive authoritarianism and the 
electoral system of single-member-district-plurality; second, their lower vote share is 
attributed to two-alliance system and polarisation of voter preferences to a great extent 
and high turnout to a lesser extent; thirdly, the effects of third-party votes are negligible; 
finally, all four groups of causal factors play a vital role in engendering spurious 
majority in Malaysia, even though in very different ways.
 1 
 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
In political sociology, the main problem of political order is the regulation of 
the struggle for power, and the underlying support of government is rather more 
imperative than its formal aspects (Broom & Selznick, 1973, p. 586). In Malaysia, the 
regulation of the struggle for power is in part undertaken, and the support of 
government is also determined to some extent, through general elections which have 
become “an established part of Malaysian political life” (Crouch, 1996, p. 114) as 
successive elections have been regularly held (Holík, 2011, p. 6; Weiss, 2015, p. 32) 
since independence and the expansion of the Federation of Malaya into Malaysia.1 
According to Rush (1992), democracy essentially revolves around elections as a means 
to elicit popular consent and determine the popular will (pp. 79-80). Scholars who have 
studied the Malaysian democracy, too, are inclined to adopt an instrumentalist view, 
even though a few of them are more pessimistic in comparison to Rush, concerning 
the roles of elections. For instance, some scholars assert that since the ruling alliance2 
has never been defeated at polls, elections presumably function as a ritualistic but 
useful means to legitimatise an authoritarian regime (Crouch, 1996, p. 114; Weiss, 
2015, p. 32). This study is concerned with such a view as political legitimacy is fer-
                                                          
1 Notable exception to this was in 1969 when polling in Sabah and Sarawak had been abruptly 
postponed due to the declaration of a state of emergency, ostensibly in response to the deadly ethnic 
riots in Peninsular Malaysia (Crouch, 1996, p. 114; Rachagan, 1993, pp. 16-17; Syed Farid, 1997, pp. 
3-4; Tunku Mohar, 2006, p. 2). 
2 Hereafter, ruling alliance refers to the National Front (previously known as the Alliance Party) which 
has persistently governed Malaysia at the federal level since independence (Ng, Rangel, Vaithilingam, 
& Pillay, 2015, p. 167; Ostwald, 2013, p. 522; Weiss, 2015, p. 33). Note that this study avoids the 
term of ruling ‘coalition’, which has been used frequently by scholars such as Khoo (2002, 2005), as 
Duverger (1951/1964) defines ‘coalition’ as ‘temporary agreement’ while ‘alliance’ as ‘lasting union’ 
(p. 331). 
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vently sought after and intensely contested electorally, even in illiberal representative 
democracies such as Malaysia. This is self-evident as the ruling alliance consistently 
justifies their uninterrupted hold on power with their colossal victories in elections. 
Given the limitations of an illiberal democracy, the ruling alliance is acutely aware 
that voting is the closest approximation to the expression of popular will  (Sherman & 
Kolker, 1987, p. 209). Election is, after all, a social mechanism in aggregating a 
particular kind of preferences of a group of people (Dowse & Hughes, 1972, p. 322).  
 
In the parliamentary democracy of Malaysia, these preferences or popular will 
are translated into legislative seats, and whichever party, coalition, or alliance that 
gains legislative majority by winning more than half of the total seats in the House of 
Representatives or Dewan Rakyat3 wins the election. The ruling alliance has been able 
to secure either earned or manufactured majorities4  in all general elections since 
independence until the Thirteenth General Election of Malaysia in 2013 in which the 
ruling alliance unprecedentedly only manages to win via a spurious majority. Spurious 
majorities entail the attainment of seat majorities despite vote minorities in elections 
(Molina Vega, 1998, p. 55). They are also known as the ‘wrong winner’ results 
(Massicotte, 2007, pp. 253, 256; Newton-Farrelly, 2009, p. 471) or ‘perverse’ results 
(Blau, 2004, pp. 444-445). In this “most fiercely contested election in Malaysia's 
history” (Ng et al., 2015, p. 167), the ruling alliance garners only 47.38 per cent of 
                                                          
3 Hereafter, only mentioned as Dewan Rakyat. Following the tradition of the United Kingdom’s 
asymmetrical bicameralism, the upper chamber of the Parliament of Malaysia, which is known as the 
Senate or Dewan Negara, is neither elected popularly or determine the formation of government, and 
as such is deemed irrelevant in this study.  
4 Earned majorities transpire when the winning party, coalition, or alliance wins both a majority of 
votes and seats, while manufactured majorities occur when a leading party in terms of votes obtains a 
majority of seats without a majority of votes (Siaroff, 2003, p. 145). In the latter, the winning party, 
coalition, or alliance loses the popular vote to a fragmented opposition, much like what occurred in the 
Third General Election of Malaysia in 1969, which remains the only time the ruling alliance wins via 
a manufactured majority. 
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popular vote, 3.49 per cent less than the opposition alliance,5 yet is awarded with 59.91 
per cent of legislative seats. Such a discrepancy between the total vote and seat shares 
for any party in any given election is known as observed disproportionality (Best & 
Zhirnov, 2015, p. 256), or alternatively as legislative or electoral disproportionality.6 
At first glance, a ‘wrong winner’ result seems to be an inevitable outcome of a distorted 
and biased process in the transfer of votes (i.e., the expression of popular will) into 
seats (i.e., the essence of representative democracy) in an election which engenders 
disproportionality. Historically, the Malaysian electoral system produces a high degree 
of disproportionality, thus poor in representation, particularly since the 1970s, and 
heavily violates the fairness principle (Croissant, 2002b, pp. 330, 360). This violation 
is an electoral bias which undermines representation as an ideal yet essential feature 
of modern democracy, and confirms Levitsky and Way’s (2010) claim that electoral 
contests in Malaysia are real and meaningful but essentially unfair and undemocratic 
(pp. 5-13). 
 
Nonetheless, Siaroff (2003) empirically discovers that high disproportionality, 
as measured by the Loosemore-Hanby Index, is not the causal factor of spurious 
majorities (p. 150). Hence, it is false and rather oversimplified to attribute the ‘wrong 
winner’ results entirely to disproportionality. This prompts an urgency to carry out a 
more calibrated examination over the actual causal factors of spurious majorities, 
which have been differentiated into systemic factors and proximate factors by Siaroff 
                                                          
5 Hereafter, opposition alliance refers to the People’s Pact, which had been formed on 1st April 2008 
(Ufen, 2009, p. 618), and disintegrated on 16th June 2015 when a component party declared that it had 
“ceased to exist” (Bedi, 2015). Unlike the ruling alliance, it is not legally registered as a single party 
(Weiss, 2015, p. 35). 
6 Hereafter, only mentioned as disproportionality. This is not to be confused with executive 
disproportionality, which Forestiere (2007) defines as the discrepancy between parties’ aggregated 
vote shares or legislative seat shares and cabinet seat shares (p. 167). 
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(2003, pp. 149-153). The former imply that spurious majorities are caused by large-
scale and intricate configurations (i.e., the electoral system, party system, and 
polarisation of voter preferences7) whereas the latter suggest that spurious majorities 
are caused by more immediate and primary phenomena (i.e., malapportionment and 
gerrymandering). This study employs a two-pronged strategy so as to better understand 
the issue of spurious majority in Malaysia. First and foremost, this study relies on the 
valuable theoretical and methodological inputs from the works of political scientists8 
and electoral geographers9 on this and related issues. Next, inspired by the critical 
work of Best and Zhirnov (2015), this study strives to segregate and examine the 
relative impacts of two groups of causal factors, namely the institutional factors and 
reactive factors (or behavioural factors as coined by the said scholars). The former 
have been rigorously studied by political scientists and electoral geographers while the 
latter have often been neglected. By doing so, this study attempts to reinvigorate the 
voting studies or vote analysis in the realm of political sociology as one of the key 
concerns in sociology has always been the studies of social behaviours. In short, this 
study undertakes a theoretical triangulation between political sociology, political 
science, and electoral geography. 
 
 
 
                                                          
7 Note that throughout this study, voter preferences exclusively refer to the electoral choices made by 
voters regarding their preferred candidates and/or parties on the ballots, and not their policy or issue 
preferences. 
8 Political sociologists have long relied upon the adaptation and acclimatisation of ideas first 
promulgated by political scientists in developing their own theories (Greer, 1969, p. 56). 
9 Even though Braungart and Braungart (2000) have neglected electoral geography as a potential 
discipline that has much to share with political sociology (p. 213), their key argument is unmistaken – 
political sociology has always been and will be benefited by relevant theoretical and methodological 
inputs from other disciplines, which should also include electoral geography, an important subfield of 
political geography within which vote studies is predominant (Leib & Quinton, 2011, p. 14). 
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The Thirteenth General Election of Malaysia in 2013 joins a short list of 
elections that produce spurious majorities, which are commonly found in the 
Commonwealth countries and countries that operate the single-member-district-
plurality electoral system or SMDP10 (Molina Vega, 1998, p. 55; Siaroff, 2003, pp. 
146-147). Such a distorted and biased electoral outcome allows the ruling alliance to 
gain an absolute majority of seats in Dewan Rakyat in spite of the loss of popular vote 
to a united opposition alliance. Since the formation of parliamentary government 
depends upon legislative majority and the relative strength of legislative parties is 
determined by the composition of Dewan Rakyat, this controversially accords 
enormous legislative and executive powers and a tremendous upper hand in the 
political contests with other legislative parties to the ‘wrong winner’ – i.e., the party, 
coalition, or alliance which wins via a spurious majority. Subsequently, spurious 
majorities are said to be potentially harmful for raising the doubt of the legitimacy of 
government (Molina Vega, 1998, p. 55), even though it may not to the extent of 
threatening its grips on power. Incidentally, such a result shows that the ruling alliance 
fails to maintain its hegemony (Ahmad Fauzi & Muhamad Takiyuddin, 2014b, p. 2). 
 
1.2 Background of the Study 
  
Political sociologists have consistently disregarded the issue of spurious 
majorities apparently due to two reasons. First, although the interdisciplinary political 
sociology11 is primarily concerned with the dynamic relationships between society and 
politics (Braungart & Braungart, 2000, p. 197; Coser, 1966/1967, p. 1; Rush, 1992, p. 
                                                          
10 Hereafter, only mentioned as SMDP. 
11 Sartori (1969) contends that political sociology is indeed an interdisciplinary hybrid which strives to 
integrate social and political explanatory variables, and thus cannot be considered as a subfield of 
sociology (pp. 69-70). 
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8), the relationship between voting and electoral outcome tends to be highly influenced 
by an emphasis in the “social bases of politics” or “societal determination of political 
processes” (Hicks, Janoski, & Schwartz, 2005, p. 1). This paradigm motivates the 
scholars to view voting behaviour, voter preferences, and policy outcomes as variables 
dependent on social cleavages, and various approaches have been developed to explain 
the nature of such dependencies (Manza, Brooks, & Sauder, 2005, pp. 201-226). Hence, 
in political sociology, the issues of ‘perverse’ results and electoral biases in the vote-
seat transfer have always been obscured, and are, for all intents and purposes, non-
issues. Second, many political sociologists, e.g. Bendix and Lipset (1966/1967), are 
subscribing to the ontological view that there is a division of labour between the two 
disciplines, with political science seeks to study the impact of state on the society while 
political sociology strives to study the impact of society on the state (p. 26). Thus, 
these issues are viewed as ‘formal’ electoral processes which are either too narrow of 
their scopes, trivial, or subject matters in political science but not political sociology.12 
 
The observations above are further aggravated by conspicuous absences in the 
electoral studies on Malaysia. On one hand, the concept of spurious majority as coined 
by Molina Vega (1998) has not been employed in the studies of the Thirteenth General 
Election of Malaysia in 2013. On the other hand, unsurprisingly, the existing literature 
on the issue of electoral biases in the vote-seat transfer – i.e., disproportionality and 
bias13 – in Malaysia is dominated by political scientists (see Brown, 2007, pp. 71-72; 
                                                          
12 This is in line with Lipset’s (1963/1973) observation that ‘political sociologists’ are inclined to view 
formal political institutions as peripheral and exerting little influence upon the society (p. 294). 
13 Scholars who have adopted the Brookes’ method typically use the term ‘bias’ to describe the 
propensity of disproportionality to work asymmetrically for different main parties in the vote-seat 
transfer, by amplifying and shrinking the seat share more disproportionately for one party than 
another. Hence, there are some delicate differences between the two concepts and the two are not 
interchangeable. 
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Croissant, 2002b, pp. 329-333; T. D. Lee, 2014; Lim, 2002a, pp. 126-127; Wong, 
2013a, 2013b; Wong et al., 2010), jurists (see Rachagan, 1980, p. 255-258, 1993, p. 
84-86), and political geographers (see Amer Saifude & Mohammad Redzuan, 2014), 
rather than political sociologists. Two notable weaknesses, however, become manifest 
in most of their works, save for the one by the last scholars mentioned. First and 
foremost, these works are plagued by a paradigm of institutional determinism,14 which 
deems the institutional factors (i.e., the electoral systems, laws, and regulations) as the 
sole group of factors effecting the electoral outcomes. Yet, such a narrow, restrictive, 
and exclusive view implies the pessimistic nature of democracy by reducing elections 
into rational-mechanical-legal products and people into utterly helpless, meaningless, 
and passive beings. Next, scholars15 are generally inclined in examining dispropor-
tionality in their studies without thoughtful considerations of its inherent weaknesses 
in accurately capturing the mechanical effects, in tandem with the psychological 
effects,16 of the electoral institutions by ignoring the substantial degree of differences 
in the strategic behaviours of political actors17 and the diverse sets of voter preferences 
(Best & Zhirnov, 2015, pp. 256-259). This misstep is exacerbated in cases of countries 
that use the extremely restrictive SMDP, such as Malaysia, as its winner-takes-all 
electoral formula effectively hinders the efforts of many candidates and small parties 
to gain representation because of its mechanical effect, and motivates the political 
actors to engage in strategic behaviours (Best & Zhirnov, 2015, pp. 256-257). In short, 
                                                          
14 See Best and Zhirnov (2015) for an overview of the domination of this paradigm in a wide range of 
electoral studies concerning disproportionality and strong criticisms against it. 
15 Since these issues have rarely attracted the attention of political sociologists, scholars in political 
science are particularly vulnerable to this misstep, as they tend to underestimate the interplay between 
electoral institutions and reactions towards it. 
16 Both mechanical and psychological effects are terms coined by Duverger (1951/1964) in his 
seminal Duverger’s law that postulates the inclination of SMDP in producing a two-party system (pp. 
216-228). 
17 Note that in this study, political actors exclusively refer to the groups of voters, candidates, and 
parties. 
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disproportionality and bias are not solely the inevitable products of institutional factors, 
and it is also pertinent to consider the effects of political actors’ reactions towards these 
institutional factors. In this study, these reactions are collectively referred to as the 
reactive factors. 
 
Therefore, an alternative approach is quintessential so as to better understand 
spurious majorities. Since it is extremely difficult to disentangle the mechanical and 
psychological effects of the electoral system, as asserted by Best and Zhirnov (2015, 
p. 264), it would be wise for this study to acknowledge and strive to understand the 
collective effects of both institutional factors and reactive factors. Pertaining to the 
systemic factors of spurious majorities, electoral system as an institutional factor is 
considered to be “insufficient” (Molina Vega, 1998, p. 55). As spurious majorities tend 
to occur in Western liberal democracies – which certainly do not include Malaysia – 
it appears that the potential roles of the political system as an institutional factor in 
engendering spurious majorities have been overlooked. Furthermore, Siaroff (2003) 
empirically discovers that party system and polarisation of voter preferences are also 
contributing towards the occurrence of spurious majorities. This study views both as 
the reactive factors as they have come under tremendous influences of the strategic 
behaviours of political actors. This also allows for the recognition and appreciation of 
the semi-autonomous nature of their behaviours. 
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Next, the proximate factors of spurious majorities are equivalent to the 
components of bias in this study. Despite criticisms of Blau (2001, 2004) and the 
alternative Soper-Rydon method (Blau, 2001, pp. 52-53), Brookes’ method18 has been 
used extensively in the studies of bias in British and New Zealand general elections19 
by both political scientists and political geographers (Borisyuk, Johnston, Thrasher, & 
Rallings, 2010; Brookes, 1959, 1960; Johnston, 1976, 2002; Johnston, Rossiter, & 
Pattie, 1999, 2006; Johnston, Borisyuk, Thrasher, & Rallings, 2012; Johnston, Rossiter, 
Pattie, & Dorling, 2002; Rossiter, et al., 1999). This method is lauded for its easily-
understood metric in the form of legislative seats to express the bias and its usefulness 
in decomposing the bias into its generating factors so that their relative impacts can be 
assessed (Johnston et al., 1999, p. 375). The latter advantage is especially valuable as 
this study strives to understand the effects of both institutional and reactive factors on 
bias. The Brookes’ method decomposes the sources of bias into two major categories, 
namely the size component and the distributional component (Johnston et al., 1999, p. 
368). The size component is commonly further broken up into various subcomponents, 
most often encompassing malapportionment, abstention, and third-party votes. While 
Amer Saifude and Mohammad Redzuan (2014, pp. 42-44) decompose the bias into 
eight components, this study would instead follow the original Brookes’ method to 
decompose it into only four components, i.e., three subcomponents of the size 
component and the distributional component. This is due to the need to segregate 
institutional factors (i.e., the malapportionment and distributional or gerrymandering 
                                                          
18 This method, which contains algebraic formulae, was first introduced by Brookes before subsequent 
adaptations by Mortimore (1992, as cited in Johnston, Rossiter, & Pattie, 1999, p. 368) and a group of 
scholars led by Johnston (since 1999). 
19 The United Kingdom has continuously operated SMDP, and spurious majority occurred in 1951 
general election while New Zealand had operated the same system until the electoral reform in 1996, 
and spurious majorities occurred in 1978 and 1981 general elections consecutively (Siaroff, 2003, pp. 
146, 149, 155). 
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components) and reactive factors (i.e., the abstention or turnout and third-party-votes 
components) in order to understand the ways each group of factors effecting the bias.20 
In short, this study is ‘internally comparative’, as pointed out by Bendix et al. (1968/ 
1973), to mean those scholarly works which deal with one empirical case by using a 
theory that derives from another, as this study examines the electoral processes in 
Malaysia using theories which have been developed over time in Western liberal 
democracies. 
 
1.3 Statement of Problem 
 
In comparison to the more frequent occurrences of spurious majority in New 
Zealand and Australia, the Thirteenth General Election of Malaysia in 2013 produces 
the very first spurious majority enjoyed by one of the world’s most enduring ruling 
regimes. This rare electoral outcome is ‘awkward’ for two major reasons. First, the 
Malaysian competitive authoritarian regime’s reliance on spectacular electoral 
victories becomes shaky as the ruling alliance lost the popular vote for the first time 
since the Third General Election of Malaysia in 1969. Thus, the consistent gains of 
more than half of all valid votes nationwide by the ruling alliance in every election 
over the span of four decades have abruptly come to a halt. Second, spurious majority 
confirms the fear and criticisms of many that the electoral playing field is so 
remarkably uneven for both the ruling and opposition alliances to the extent that the 
ruling alliance wins a majority of seats21 in Dewan Rakyat despite its loss of popular 
                                                          
20 Another obvious reason is the methodological mistakes of calculating the dubious components of 
‘national electorate quota’ (ambiguity in its given definition does not help) and ‘minor party victories’ 
so as to add up with other components in order to obtain the total bias, when clearly both are absent in 
the context of Malaysia. 
21 Note that throughout this study, a majority of seats means more than half of all seats in Dewan 
Rakyat, i.e., 112 or more seats out of a total of 222 seats. 
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vote to the opposition alliance. In other words, the ruling alliance wins the general 
election with neither a majority of votes nor a plurality of votes.22 It is clear that voter 
preferences have been skewed, resulting in the very disproportionate distribution of 
seats between the two main alliances in Dewan Rakyat.  
 
Therefore, the key issue herein is the determination of the specific set of causal 
factors and the ways that lead to the ruling alliance’s victory in a majority of seats even 
though they gain fewer votes than the opposition alliance. In order to grasp this issue, 
eight separate but interrelated causal factors which are categorised into four groups of 
causal factors – a pair in each group – are identified and scrutinised. The first two 
groups of causal factors below pertain to the large-scale and intricate configurations 
sustained by various groups of political actors. The first group of causal factors is the 
institutional systemic causal factors of spurious majority which include the political 
system and electoral system. The former is an institutional factor as it refers to the 
political institutions that directly or indirectly shape the electoral playing field in broad 
but important ways via various means. On the other hand, the latter is an institutional 
factor as it refers to the electoral institutions that govern the various aspects in the 
administration of elections.  
 
The second group of causal factors is the reactive systematic causal factors of 
spurious majority that include the party system and polarisation of voter preferences. 
The former is a reactive factor because the historically fragmented opposition parties 
in Malaysia have made the strategic decisions to form firstly an electoral alliance and 
                                                          
22 A majority of votes means that a candidate, party, coalition, or alliance obtains the most votes by 
winning more than half of all valid votes in either a face-off or a multi-cornered contest, while a 
plurality of votes means that a candidate, party, coalition, or alliance obtains the most votes even 
though it wins less than half of all valid votes in a highly competitive multi-cornered contest. 
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later a parliamentary alliance since 2008, even though the electoral system, laws, and 
regulations do not overtly stipulate or encourage such alliances.23 Besides, the ruling 
alliance has endured through time largely due to the overriding need for them to gain 
an absolute majority, or even a two-thirds majority, of seats in Dewan Rakyat despite 
their constant internal bickering. On the other hand, the latter is a reactive factor as the 
‘wrong winner’ result hinges upon the strategic decisions of voters who are almost 
evenly split between those who aspire to preserve the political status quo and those 
who seek to transform it. They could have voted overwhelmingly for one of the two 
alliances so as to produce a landslide victory, or rather a substantial portion of them 
could have split their votes by casting the ballots in favour of the third parties and 
independent candidates. The various alternative sets of voter preferences demonstrate 
that voters are in part autonomous and self-interested. 
 
The next two groups of causal factors are related to the more immediate and 
primary phenomena that exert varying levels of influences on electoral outcomes. The 
third group of causal factors is the institutional proximate causal factors of spurious 
majority comprising malapportionment and gerrymandering. Both are the institutional 
factors as they are closely related to the biased constituency re-delineation by election 
or boundary commission. Many scholars have rightly studied either malapportionment, 
gerrymandering, or both as they invariably reward the ruling alliance with amplified 
seat shares to the detriment of all opposition parties from one election to another. The 
amplified seat share of the ruling alliance is known as either the ‘winner’s bonus’24 
                                                          
23 E.g. the Societies Act 1966 evidently remains vague pertaining to the registration of a political 
coalition or alliance comprising multiple officially-registered political parties. As such, the ruling 
alliance remains the only officially-registered political coalition or alliance in Malaysia. 
24 Ironically such a bonus may also be enjoyed by the runner-up party, even though the third parties 
are invariably not entitled to it (Borisyuk et al., 2010, p. 733). 
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(Borisyuk et al., 2010, p. 733; Johnston et al., 2002, p. 134; Newton-Farrelly, 2009, p. 
472), ‘winner’s bias’ (Taylor & Johnston, 1979, pp. 392-396), ‘big party bias’ (Lim, 
2002b, p. 180), ‘big-party bonus’ (Lim, 2002a, p. 127),25 ‘distortion effect’ (Ng et al., 
2015, p. 170), and ‘majority-forming bonus’ (Rae, 1971, p. 74). However, institutional 
factors alone may not sufficiently explain the varying degrees of such ‘winner’s 
bonuses’, particularly as many electoral contests are fought on the same electoral map 
between the reviews of constituency boundaries. Therefore, it is crucial to concurrently 
examine the possible effects of the fourth group of causal factors – i.e., the reactive 
proximate causal factors encompassing turnout and third-party votes – in engendering 
spurious majority. Both are reactive factors as they are closely associated with the 
strategic decisions of voters, party leaders, and candidates. The examination of ‘bias’ 
comprising these two groups of causal factors is far superior to the examination of 
‘disproportionality’ since ‘bias’ can be decomposed into its generating factors. This is 
very appealing due to two reasons – first, it allows for the assessment of their relative 
impacts, that, in turn, helps to determine the relative impacts between institutional 
factors and reactive factors; second, it helps to ascertain the beneficiary and victim – 
i.e., the alliance that is favoured or disfavoured – of each generating factor of ‘bias’ 
and the total ‘bias’. 
 
It is highly plausible that the causal factors above do not exert similar level of 
influences on spurious majority in Malaysia, and it is fairly certain that the more and 
most influential causal factors engender this spurious majority in very different, albeit 
interrelated, ways. Besides, it is also crucial to determine the relative impacts between 
                                                          
25 The unique party system in Malaysia renders both terms by Lim to be imprecise since minor parties 
within the ruling alliance may also enjoy such a bias, while medium parties both within and without 
the ruling alliance, though much larger than the aforementioned, may not enjoy it. 
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the contrasting groups of causal factors. On one hand, the relative impacts between 
systemic factors and proximate factors are rather murky as a number of causal factors 
in both groups are intertwined. For instance, the electoral system in the former group 
is closely related to malapportionment and gerrymandering in the latter group. On the 
other hand, the relative impacts between institutional factors and reactive factors have 
been eclipsed by the dominance of either the paradigm of institutional determinism or 
the paradigm of the ‘social bases of politics’. These confusions certainly require 
clarifications. There is a strong desire to get to the bottom of spurious majority in 
Malaysia as it does not only threaten to misrepresent voter preferences, but may also 
undermine the legitimacy of the electoral system, government, and regime in the eyes 
of the population, skew the political contests unfairly in favour of the ruling alliance, 
and erode the consolidation of democracy in Malaysia. 
 
1.4 Research Questions 
 
This study is concerned with the following questions: 
 
1. Which are the causal factors of, and how these causal factors engender, 
the ‘spurious majority’, ‘wrong winner’ result, or ‘perverse’ result in the Thirteenth 
General Election of Malaysia in 2013? 
2. What are the relative impacts between systemic factors and proximate 
factors, and between institutional factors and reactive factors, on the ‘spurious 
majority’, ‘wrong winner’ result, or ‘perverse’ result in the Thirteenth General 
Election of Malaysia in 2013? 
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1.5 Research Objectives 
 
This study has the following objectives: 
 
1. To determine the causal factors of, and examine the ways these causal 
factors engender, the ‘spurious majority’, ‘wrong winner’ result, or ‘perverse’ result 
in the Thirteenth General Election of Malaysia in 2013. 
2. To determine the relative impacts between systemic factors and 
proximate factors, and between institutional factors and reactive factors, on the 
‘spurious majority’, ‘wrong winner’ result, or ‘perverse’ result in the Thirteenth 
General Election of Malaysia in 2013. 
 
1.6 Significance of the Study 
 
This study is significant due to the following three rationales. 
 
First of all, to the best of the researcher’s knowledge, this study represents the 
first attempt to examine spurious majorities in political sociology. This study does not 
dispute the productiveness or appropriateness of the predominant paradigm of “social 
bases of politics” or “societal determination of political processes” (Hicks et al., 2005, 
p. 1) in political sociology. Rather, this study seeks to strike a delicate balance between 
this paradigm and the paradigm of institutional determinism26 by cherishing the key 
propositions of both, namely the recognition that politics (i.e., electoral outcomes and 
political legitimacy) is greatly affected by society (i.e., reactive factors such as voter 
                                                          
26 In his study of the party system and representation of social groups, Lipset (1963/1973) found both 
paradigms to be unsatisfactory on their own (p. 278). 
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turnout, voter preferences, and party system) in the former, and the acknowledgment 
of the profound roles of institutional factors (i.e., the political system, electoral system, 
and constituency re-delineation) in the latter. Moreover, this study rejects the idea that 
spurious majorities are ‘formal’ electoral processes which are either too narrow of their 
scopes, trivial, or subject matters in political science but not political sociology. It is a 
matter of grave concern for the voter preferences to be viewed as the popular will of 
Malaysians, especially when other forms of political participation (e.g. demonstrations 
and political discussions in both print and electronic media) may be severely restricted 
in Malaysia. Therefore, although voting is deemed as “the least active form of political 
participation” by Rush (1992, p. 115), it does play a somewhat meaningful role as it is 
both literally and figuratively the only game in town for ordinary Malaysians (Weiss, 
2015, p. 42). Spurious majorities are a pertinent issue in political sociology simply 
because they may threaten representation as a vital feature of modern democracy and 
legitimacy of the electoral system, government, and regime. 
 
Secondly, this study represents the first attempt to use the concept of spurious 
majority in the electoral studies on the Thirteenth General Election of Malaysia in 2013. 
The use of such a concept facilitates the efforts of scholars in better understanding the 
peculiarity of the electoral contest and outcome of this general election vis-à-vis all 
past general elections. Moreover, by identifying the types of legislative majority 
enjoyed by the ruling alliance over the years, one may gain valuable insights into the 
developments of political system and party system in Malaysia, and presumptively 
allow scholars to assess the types of legislative majority, and thus the natures of 
electoral victory for any winning party, coalition, or alliance in the subsequent general 
elections to be held in the future. The variation of the types of legislative majority from 
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one election to another relies on the variation of systemic factors (in particular the 
reactive systemic causal factors as the Malaysian electoral system is largely stable over 
the years without significant changes) and proximate factors. 
  
Lastly, this study seeks to further our understanding of the roles, operations, 
and impacts of electoral processes in competitive authoritarian regimes. Even though 
Malaysia is not a liberal democracy (Khondker, 1996, p. 74; Mahathir, 1995, p. 46), 
and is widely recognised as an authoritarian regime operating competitive elections 
with varying degrees of opposition from one election to another (Levitsky & Way, 
2010, pp. 33-34), most Malaysians have come to embrace some of the basic ideals of 
liberal democracy, most notably the regularly-held elections in order to express their 
popular will in a Schumpeterian sense of democracy.27 The view that election is simply 
a manipulative legitimating device by the conflict theorists (Sherman & Kolker, 1987, 
p. 12) fails to elucidate the probable reasons of consistent high turnout in competitive 
authoritarian regimes, where turnout is not compulsory or forced, and people generally 
realise the limitations of illiberal democracy. This study argues that precisely because 
of the repressive nature of such regimes that permit only a limited extent of political 
participation, voting is seen as the most widespread, pragmatic, and legitimate way for 
people to express their will. Thus, voter preferences should be respected. Yet, skewed 
vote-seat transfers have consistently misrepresented voter preferences in favour of the 
ruling alliance, thereby diminishing the legitimacy of the electoral system, government, 
and regime. This is further aggravated by the occurrence of a spurious majority which 
                                                          
27 Schumpeter (1942/1976) promotes a minimalist or proceduralist definition of democracy by stating 
that democracy is the institutional arrangement in which individuals obtain the power to make 
political decisions through the means of competition or struggle for the people’s vote (p. 269). See 
also Urbinati (2011, pp. 37-39) and Syed Ahmad (2002, p. 77) for further discussions. 
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indicates that a growing and substantial segment of population no longer supports the 
ruling alliance. 
 
1.7  Scope of the Study 
 
Since Malaysia operates a centralised or an asymmetrical federal system (Clark 
et al., 2013, p. 686), this study focuses on the general election at the federal level, as it 
is here that most are at stake for all political actors. Thus, although the ruling alliance 
has outsmarted the opposition alliance in the Thirteenth State Election of Perak in 2013 
via a spurious majority too, this study views general election as the most representative 
of the popular will of most, if not all, Malaysians. On the other hand, this study adopts, 
in Blau’s term (2001, p. 47), the ‘single-election approach’ by looking exclusively at 
the Thirteenth General Election of Malaysia in 2013. The rationale of doing so has less 
to do with Blau’s (2001, p. 47) criticisms over the alternative ‘multi-election approach’ 
than this study’s goal to examine the causal factors and the ways that lead to spurious 
majority in Malaysia, which has only occurred for the first time in this general election. 
  
1.8 Limitation of the Study 
 
There are three major limitations of this study.  
 
Firstly, the quantitative method in this study is entirely based on voting study 
or vote analysis – i.e., quantitative analysis on numerical data derived from electoral 
outcomes. One of most basic assumptions in any voting study or vote analysis is to 
view voter preferences as synonymous with their party preferences. Nonetheless, this 
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dubious assumption risks underestimating or overlooking the fact that a segment of 
voters makes their electoral choices, not so much based on the candidates’ affiliated 
parties, but rather their personal preferences over the candidates’ characteristics and 
backgrounds. This study does not intend to dispute such a fact. Yet, since Malaysia 
has a robustly institutionalised party system (Weiss, 2015, p. 25), citizens’ assessments 
of candidates are feasible based on their affiliated parties’ programs and performances, 
rather than simply their own personalities or primordial appeals (Payne, 2007, p. 150). 
Thus, candidates’ party affiliations provide substantial information pertaining to their 
ideological or programmatic preferences (Mainwaring & Zoco, 2007, p. 157; Payne, 
2007, p. 150), and facilitate political participation of citizens who have little time and 
political information (Mainwaring & Scully, 1995, p. 3). Moreover, party affiliations 
on the ballots significantly enhance or reduce the electoral prospects of candidates, 
especially since many of them are unbeknown to voters as they either are political 
novices or keep a low profile in the national politics. Besides, ballots in Malaysia are 
designed in such a way that highlights the candidates’ party affiliation. 
 
Secondly, the quantitative analysis is ‘incomplete’ in the sense that it does not 
cover the examination of one of the institutional systemic causal factors – i.e., political 
system or, in the case of Malaysia, competitive authoritarianism. This is mostly due to 
the lack of relevant and precise quantitative measures rooted in vote analysis that can 
accurately uncover the complex relationship between competitive authoritarianism 
and spurious majority, particularly since many scholars who examine authoritarianism 
tend to rely on either content analysis, historical analysis, observations, interviews, 
some, or all of the above. They may include some brief numerical data or analyses in 
their studies, but these tend to be minimal and not comprehensive enough to cover 
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most, if not all, aspects of authoritarianism. This predicament is exacerbated by three 
challenges – first, there are diverging views pertaining to the aspects or features of 
authoritarianism; second, different authoritarian regimes may employ diverse means 
in preserving and strengthening their grips on power, albeit with varying levels of 
effectiveness; and third, spurious majority has never occurred in a modern competitive 
authoritarian regime in Asia, thus scholars are understandably ill-prepared in carrying 
out a quantitative analysis on the causal relationship between the two. The inclusion 
of this causal factor in this study is prompted by the narrative data that either explicitly 
or implicitly show some causal relationships between the two, even though it has been 
decided from the outset that a quantitative analysis on this causal factor is omitted from 
this study due to the predicament and challenges above. 
 
Thirdly, the qualitative analysis is skewed towards narratives of the victims of 
spurious majority as a great majority – except one – of participants are members of 
parliament (MPs)28 from the opposition alliance. The primary reason for this to occur 
is because they have more motivations to express their takes on, and woes related to, 
spurious majority in Malaysia. In contrast, the beneficiaries of spurious majority may 
find the concept of spurious majority inconvenient as it inevitably raises doubts on the 
legitimacy of the electoral outcome. As the powers that be, they actually have very 
few incentives to agree to an interview. Besides, as stressed by the only participant 
who is the beneficiary of spurious majority, the ruling alliance wins the election within 
the constitutional framework of the Westminster parliamentary system, thus they are 
very likely to feel that there is very little need or significance in studying spurious 
majority. Furthermore, many of the beneficiaries of spurious majority are ministers, 
                                                          
28 Hereafter, only mentioned as MP or MPs. 
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deputy ministers, and/or party leaders with heavy responsibilities and tight 
schedules.29  Another important concern is that a scholarly interview may be less 
appealing than a journalist’s interview as self-interest may prompt many MPs to agree 
to the latter for the sake of valuable news coverage. Nevertheless, MPs are still very 
important sources of narrative data who have firsthand knowledge of, and strong stakes 
in, spurious majority in Malaysia. 
 
1.9 Chapterisation of the Study 
 
There are five chapters in this study, namely Chapter 1: Introduction, Chapter 
2: Literature Review and Conceptual Framework, Chapter 3: Research Methodology, 
Chapter 4: Data Analyses, and Chapter 5: Meta-inference and Discussion. The first 
chapter provides an overview that outlines the key information of this study. Then, 
Chapter 2 details the reviews of scholarly works pertaining to the concepts and issues 
that are both pertinent and vital to this study, before discussing the operationalisation 
of various key concepts and a conceptual framework. Afterwards, Chapter 3 addresses 
and elucidates the research design of this study by tackling the relevant philosophical, 
methodological, and technical issues arising from the use of both quantitative and 
qualitative methods. Next, Chapter 4 begins with the quantitative analysis on each 
causal factor of spurious majority (except the institutional systemic causal factor of 
political system) based on numerical data derived from electoral outcomes, followed 
by the qualitative analysis based on narrative data derived from interview accounts. In 
each analysis, the levels of influences of these causal factors on spurious majority, and 
the ways they engender spurious majority, are determined and explained. Finally, 
                                                          
29 One of the deputy ministers from the ruling alliance politely turns down the researcher’s invitation 
for an interview as “time is a constraint” and due to “heavy responsibilities”. 
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Chapter 5 concludes with a meta-inference that aims to integrate findings from the 
separate data analyses above before highlighting a few major takeaways from these 
integrated findings. Besides, a few vital paradigmatic, methodological, and attitudinal 
issues arising from the research findings are explicated concisely, followed by a few 
recommendations for future research. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW AND CONCEPTUAL  
  FRAMEWORK 
 
2.1 Democratic Representation in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes 
 
Democratic representation is a contentious issue in competitive authoritarian 
regimes like Malaysia. Many scholars have devoted their studies of Malaysia to the 
intertwined ethnic representation and party representation, particularly in the studies 
on constituency re-delineation.30 Yet, this study only looks at party representation in 
line with the vote-seat paradigm – one of the dominant paradigms in the studies of 
democratic representation31 – pioneered by Rae (1971) for the following rationales. 
 
First of all, the vote-seat paradigm excels by simplistically (but pragmatically) 
conceiving citizen preferences as voter preferences which are explicitly expressed via 
party votes in order to overcome the empirical and normative challenges inherent in 
any such studies (Powell, 2004, pp. 274-275, 291-292). Voter preferences are deemed 
as the most pragmatic way in understanding the aggregated citizens’ opinions due to 
Schattschneider’s (1942/2004) ‘law of the imperfect political mobilisation of interests’ 
as voters are inevitably torn by the diversity of their own interests (p. 33). This is 
despite Schedler’s (2006) view of the authoritarian distortions in the formation and 
expression of popular preferences (p. 8) precisely because firstly, voting is indeed the 
most widespread, pragmatic, and legitimate way for people to express their preferences 
                                                          
30 Studies of the intertwined ethnic and party representations in Malaysia may devote specific 
attentions to constituency re-delineation or not – e.g. see Brown (2007) and H. G. Lee (2013) for the 
former; see Khoo (2002, p. 61) and Puthucheary (2005) for the latter. 
31 The alternative – issue-congruence paradigm – is not appropriate in the context of Malaysia due to 
the high level of legislative party disciplines that strongly discourage any dissenting views and votes, 
which Powell (2004) argues is prevalent in most parliamentary systems (p. 284). 
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in competitive authoritarian regimes; and secondly, votes and electoral outcomes are 
not falsified despite electoral irregularities in Malaysia (Holík, 2011, p. 6). Besides, 
this paradigm views the vote-seat proportionality as the standard of desirable 
representation since elections authoritatively reveal the aggregated concerns and 
opinions of citizens (Powell, 2004, pp. 279, 281).32 Second, some scholars affirm 
unequivocally that representation cannot be dissociated from party. For instance, 
Duverger (1951/1964) argues that parties intervene in the relationships between public 
opinions and its expression in parliament, and the nature of such an intervention is 
both complicated and intertwined (p. 372). Likewise, Wessels (2011) claims that 
parliaments are the crucial institutions that induce representation, yet this 
representation’s only model is party democracy (pp. 97-98).33 
 
Moreover, since representation is shaped by the interactions between voter 
preferences, electoral systems, and party systems (Powell, 2004, p. 279), it is vital to 
grasp their complex relationships. Electoral outcomes are determined, to some extent, 
by electoral rules and practices, which itself is depended on the adoption of a particular 
understanding of democracy (Katz, 2005, p. 17). Representation in Malaysia is rested 
upon the majoritarian vision which aims to represent a majority of voters, and has been 
institutionalised through the majoritarian electoral systems (Wessels, 2011, p. 99).34 
SMDP accentuates the geographical localisation of opinions by problematically 
turning a national opinion into a local opinion via representation of such an opinion in 
                                                          
32 Hence Powell (2004) views this paradigm as essentially focusing on the ‘procedural’ representation 
(p. 274). See his work too on the flaws of this paradigm (pp. 280-282, 292). 
33 See also Schattschneider (1942/2004, p. 1) and Blais (1999, pp. 5-6). M. Ong (1987) goes even 
further by declaring that the rise of modern political parties has undermined the roles of Parliament of 
Malaysia (pp. 7-22).  
34 This vision contradicts the proportional vision that aims to represent as many voters as possible, and 
has been institutionalised through the proportional representation electoral systems (Wessels, 2011, p. 
99). One of the variations of majoritarian electoral systems is SMDP (Clark et al., 2013, p. 543). 
